

REDUCING DRUG DEALING IN PRIVATE APARTMENT COMPLEXES IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

A Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services on the Field Applications of the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Project

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SUMMARY

This project is one of several commissioned by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the COPS office, to evaluate the utility of the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police – the POP Guides. Police in four cities were invited to mount a project to deal with a problem covered by one of the guides. An outside consultant would be made available and would write the report.

The project reported here was mounted in Newark, NJ. Making use of the guide on *Drug Dealing in Privately Owned*

Apartment Complexes, it would scan for problem apartment complexes in the city, analyze the drug markets at two or three of these, develop appropriate responses, and assess the interventions.

The first step was to identify problem apartment complexes suitable for treatment.

Twenty-two possible sites were identified through analysis of police data and by

drawing on the Department's knowledge of drug markets in the city. More detailed analysis of these sites was then undertaken

to identify the two or three for intervention. It was found that several of the apartment complexes were located in close proximity to entry/exit ramps for Interstate 78, which provided out-of-town buyers with easy access to drug markets. The buyers could briefly enter the city, purchase drugs, drive around in a loop and quickly exit again. Loops of this kind were associated with both sets of interstate ramps serving the city. This information led to a change of direction for the project: instead of making changes at specific apartment buildings, it would seek to make it more difficult and risky for out-of-towners to purchase drugs in the loop.

It was decided to intervene in only one of the loops, with the other serving as a comparison. The intervention would consist of a traffic management plan (developed with the Newark Traffic Engineer) to alter traffic patterns and restrict parking in the loop, accompanied by enhanced law enforcement at the problematic apartment complexes. The intervention is not yet fully implemented, but it will be evaluated using a variety of pre- and post-intervention data about drug dealing. It will dovetail with a more ambitious project by the State government to rebuild the ramps to route traffic away from residential areas.

The project has already yielded valuable lessons about introducing problem-oriented policing in a large city police department and about drug dealing at privately rented apartment complexes. Despite the change of focus in mid-stream, the guide still proved useful and the project endorsed the concept underlying the series – police will make use of research when the results are presented in easily digestible form.

INTRODUCTION

The *Problem-Oriented Guides for Police*¹, issued by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), are designed to

assist local police in dealing with specific crime and disorder problems. Each guide summarizes existing knowledge about a specific kind of problem, and then helps police analyze and respond to the variant of the problem encountered in their jurisdiction. Soon after the first batch of guides had been completed, COPS funded a study – the Field Applications Project – to test their utility. Police in four cities were invited to mount a problem-oriented policing project on a problem covered by a guide, which would be used to structure the project. A consultant drawn from the group of writers who produced the guides would provide whatever help was needed and would also provide a report on the project.

The cities invited to participate in the Field Applications Project were Chula Vista (California), Newark (New Jersey), Raleigh (North Carolina) and Savannah (Georgia). Their choice was determined by the location of the four consultants selected by the COPS office, but the police department in each city chose the problem that would be addressed. This arrangement had several advantages. For the police, it secured expert assistance in mounting a problem-oriented policing project to deal with a problem they wished to address. For the consultant, it provided first hand knowledge of the way that police use the guides, which would be of assistance in producing future guides. For the COPS office, it would provide important feedback on the guides, in which they had made a considerable investment.

For Newark, the subject of the present report, the choice of problem was straightforward. The Police Director, Joseph Santiago, chose to address violence associated with drug dealing, which was of great concern to the city. Of the available guides, *Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes*, was the most relevant to this problem. He assigned Captain John Shane, Commanding Officer,

Policy and Planning Division, to serve as the liaison between the Newark Police Department (NPD) and the consultant, Ronald V. Clarke, who is based at the Newark campus of Rutgers University.² As the NPD's analytic capability was already fully committed in serving the Compstat process and in providing routine administrative and operational data, Nick Zanin, a graduate student at the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice was recruited under the grant to provide the analytic support needed for any major problem-oriented policing project.

The original intention was to identify two or three apartment complexes with active drug markets that might be brought under control by design and management changes. To increase the chances of success, these changes would be accompanied by heightened police enforcement focused on arresting the most active dealers. With these offenders out of the way, the design and management changes would have a better chance of achieving a long-term reduction in drug dealing and the associated violence. However, it soon became clear that a better investment of effort would be to focus the project on several troublesome apartment complexes located close to one of the exits serving a major interstate (I-78) running by the city. The exit facilitated purchase of drugs by out-of-towners who came to the city for this express purpose. They could easily find drugs at one of the apartment complexes near the exit without venturing too far into the city, and then loop round quickly back onto the highway. It also meant that commuters working in the city who wanted to buy drugs could conveniently stop-off at one of the apartment complexes on their way to or from work.

As a result, the response phase of the project focused on developing a plan to change traffic patterns to reduce the convenience of these "out-of-town"

purchases, whether by commuters or not. Considerable help with the plan was received from the city's Traffic Engineer. In fact, the State had already developed a plan to alter the exit to improve traffic flows in and out of the city and to route traffic away from residential areas. Though not the intention, these changes would likely reduce drug dealing at the apartments close to the exit. As construction was not due to start until 2004, discussions with the Traffic Engineer focused on two issues: interim changes to street patterns that might be brought into effect before construction commenced; and for the longer term, refining the construction plans to increase the impact on drug dealing. At the same time, a plan was developed for increasing police enforcement to reinforce the effect of the traffic changes.

This report provides a description of the project undertaken in Newark, from its inception in October 2001 till mid-January 2004. At the time of writing, the response selected (a combination of traffic management and police enforcement) was not fully implemented and assessment was still at the planning stage.

The familiar SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) structured the project, but, like many problem-oriented policing projects, it diverged from the model at several points, notably when the focus was redefined. Accordingly, the report follows the order of tasks undertaken rather than SARA.

DRUG MARKETS IN NEWARK

The initial goal of the project was to identify two or three particularly problematic apartment complexes where there was a good chance of making interventions suggested by the guide. To accomplish this it was necessary to gain some understanding of drug markets in Newark. The first step

was for Dr. Clarke and Mr. Zanin to go on “ride-alongs” with the NPD’s Safer Cities Task Force (SCTF) and Special Investigations Unit (SIU).

The SCTF is a group of plainclothes officers who patrol the city at night in a team of about eight officers in four unmarked cars. They stop and talk to people who are loitering in front of apartment buildings, at street corners and outside stores. During the course of a night, they often observe drug transactions taking place. The ride-alongs with the SCTF yielded information about the most common drugs sold, locations that were especially busy, how sellers and buyers communicated, and how they avoided arrest.

The SIU uses undercover officers to conduct buy-bust operations and, on several occasions in the early months of the project, Clarke and Zanin accompanied units from the SIU in a surveillance van to observe a number of problem apartment buildings. These observations yielded detailed information about the operation of drug markets at several private apartment complexes, and general information about dealers and buyers, in particular about whether the latter were predominantly local people or out-of-towners (see Table 1).

In parallel with these ride-alongs, an analysis was undertaken of the SIU’s arrest data for 2001 to see what information it yielded about active drug markets (identifying information was removed from the data before they were released for analysis). Nearly 10,000 arrests were analyzed. Eighty-five percent of those arrested were male; the mean age was 29; 73% were black; and 71% were Newark residents. As for the drugs involved, 32% were arrested with heroin, 30% with cocaine, 16% with marijuana, and 10% with crack (see Table 2).

The arrests for 2001 were geocoded using ArcView (98% of addresses were matched) to see if the resulting pin map would reveal any concentrations or “hot spots” of arrests, but arrests turned out to be scattered too widely across the city for this map to serve its purpose. More useful was a density map of arrests created using ArcView Spatial Analyst, with a street network overlay³ (see Appendix 1). This revealed a number of arrest hot spots that might have indicated the location of drug markets. Overlaying this map on the original pin map showed that many drug arrests also occurred outside these hot spots (Appendix 2).

The density map in Appendix 1 also shows the borders of the city’s four police districts – North, South, West and East. It is clear that drug arrest hotspots are fairly evenly distributed between the North, South and West Districts, but there are relatively few in the East District. Table 3 shows that the distribution of calls for service for drug offenses in the four districts and is consistent with the picture in Appendix 1 based on arrest data.

DRUG MARKETS IN PRIVATE APARTMENT COMPLEXES

While the calls for service and drug arrest data yielded valuable background information for the project, they did not pinpoint drug markets in private apartment complexes. This could only be done through continued observation with the SCTF and SIU, through discussions with district commanders and their staff, and through more detailed geographic analysis of data. The objective was to identify approximately 20 problematic apartment complexes, before narrowing down the list to two or three that had the worst problem, or that could be changed through the interventions recommended by the guide. These two or

three complexes would be the focus of the interventions.

For the purposes of the study, an apartment complex was defined as a single building or multi-building complex with five or more apartments. Sixteen potential problem apartment complexes meeting this definition were identified in the course of ride-alongs, and an additional six sites were identified through spatial analysis of 2001 arrest data. This resulted in 22 potential sites for the project (Appendix 3). The process of elimination proceeded as follows (Table 4 for details):

1. Eleven sites not located in an identified hotspot or with fewer than 15 arrests in 2001 (see Table 5) were eliminated.
2. Four apartment complexes were eliminated that proved to be public housing.
3. One site was eliminated because the district commander believed it was now under control.
4. Individual meetings with district commanders to discuss the six remaining sites (Appendix 4) resulted in the elimination of an additional site that was no longer a problem and the identification of four additional problem sites. This exercise therefore resulted in the identification of nine problem sites, out of which two or three were to be selected for intensive treatment.

REDEFINING THE PROBLEM

Four of the apartment complexes selected for closer study were in the South District, three were in the North, two in the West and none in the East. Again, this distribution corresponded loosely with the distribution of drug calls for service and drug arrests. To check whether it matched the distribution of privately owned apartment complexes, a list

of these was sought from the city. After discussions with the Police Department, the Fire Department, the Tax Assessor, and the City Engineer, it became apparent that no accurate list was maintained and one would have to be created by putting together different lists, cleaning them, making them compatible and then excluding redundant entries. This was a much more difficult task than anticipated at the outset. It stretched over several months, and was only accomplished with the help of Denise Stankowitz, GIS analyst with the MIS Division of the police department (see Appendix 5 for methodology).

The final database included 506 privately owned apartment complexes. Appendix 6 is a density map of these complexes for the city and Table 5 shows their distribution by police district. Three facts are apparent from Table 5:

1. Only a small percentage of all privately owned apartment complexes in the city could be considered problematic drug dealing sites. This remained true even when the 11 apartment complexes with fewer than 15 arrests or which were outside any drug arrest hot spot were retained in the sample. Their retention would raise the number of problematic complexes from nine to 20 and from 2% of the total to 4%.
2. The East District, which contains most of the privately owned apartment complexes, contains none of the problem sites. (This may not be surprising, because the prior analysis showed that the East District had fewer drug arrests than the other districts.)
3. A very high proportion (4 out of 14) of the comparatively few private apartment complexes in the South District were identified as problems. These four problem apartment

complexes were geographically concentrated and were all close to an exit ramp off Interstate 78, which channels commuters and other out-of-city traffic directly into the area.

Together, these facts suggested that private apartment complexes in a large urban area might not be inherently accommodating for drug sales, but their location near an interstate or a major artery might compound the problem. In fact, evidence of this relationship has been noted in several research studies (see Table 6) projects.

Captain John Scott-Bey, South District Commander, confirmed that the proximity of the I-78 exit greatly exacerbated the drug problem in his district. He said that both interchanges for I-78 in the South District offered direct access into residential neighborhoods and a quick “loop” back onto the interstate. He reinforced the point by driving Clarke and Zanin around the loops and past the four identified problem apartment complexes, which all fell within one of the loops. Driving either of the loops and making a quick stop to purchase drugs would take no more than a few minutes. He said two main groups of buyers were involved in this trade – out-of-towners who came to the area expressly to purchase drugs and who left as quickly as possible, and commuters working in the city who purchased drugs either on entering the city in the morning or leaving it at night.

As the loop appeared to be the underlying problem, offering drug buyers easy access to apartment complexes where drug markets were located, the project staff decided at this point to change the focus of the project and target the loop that included the four problem sites (Loop 1) instead of targeting two or three problem buildings throughout the city. The *POP Guide*

suggested that a useful intervention for this type of problem was “limiting potential buyers’ ability to cruise through the area in search of open drug markets.” While Loop 2 offered the same easy-off-easy-on access, its traffic pattern was more complex and would be harder to change. Moreover, Captain Scott-Bey believed that the drug problem in Loop 2 was already being contained.

An immediate cost of making changes to Loop 1 might be displacement of the problem to Loop 2, which was only about one mile further west along I-78. This possibility will need to be investigated during the assessment stage.

TARGETING LOOP 1

More information was needed about the loops, but first a geographic boundary for each had to be defined. The boundaries shown in Appendices 7-9 were defined with the help of South District Command staff. Table 6 provides data about the loops and compares them with the city as whole. This comparison showed:

1. The two loops covered a similar (small) geographic area and population, though Loop 2 was somewhat larger
2. They account for similar (relatively large) proportions of drug calls for service, drug arrests, shootings and shots fired
3. Loop 1, with a population of 3% of the city accounted for a disproportionately large proportion of homicides and gun homicides (14.3%) in the entire city. This disproportion of homicides confirmed the decision to focus the project on Loop 1 rather than Loop 2.

CHANGING THE TRAFFIC PATTERN

Appendix 11 shows an aerial photograph of Loop 1 with a possible driving pattern, and Appendix 12 shows the same area with the same driving pattern past the project sites (Appendix 13 explains the site names). The existing configuration of the streets makes it possible to enter the neighborhood from I-78, drive past the project sites within a few minutes, and then easily access the highway again. Photographs of the project sites taken by the project team are also included in Appendixes 14-33. (The aerial photos were taken from a National Guard helicopter made available to the NPD to support drug interdiction efforts.)

The next stage of the project was to determine if the traffic pattern in Loop 1 could be changed to make it more difficult and risky for out-of-towners to purchase drugs at the four problematic sites. A meeting to discuss this possibility was held with Dr. Bahman Izmadeir, the Traffic Engineer on August 15, 2002. It was a great (but pleasant) surprise for the project team to learn that plans had already been made by the city, with \$25 million funding from New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJ DOT), to reroute the I-78 entry/exit ramps in Loop 1. Though these plans were many years in the making, the Police Department seemed not to have been made aware of them. The new ramps would take traffic directly onto an arterial street and away from the residential area into which it now debouched (see Table 7 for a summary of changes and Appendix 34 for a map). Though not the specific intention, the new ramps would virtually eliminate direct access to the problem apartment buildings sites for incoming traffic.

The construction plan required a new elementary school to be built to replace the existing Belmont-Runyon School located near the interstate ramps. In 1997 a young

boy, Terrell James, had been struck by a car and killed while crossing the street near the school. The driver was an out-of-town drug buyer speeding onto the interstate after purchasing heroin. The incident was widely reported by the local media, including the New York Times and the Newark Star Ledger, and was mentioned in passing by several police officers. The Traffic Engineer said the boy's death had led directly to some small improvements to the plans for the new ramp construction. (Appendix 10 is an aerial photograph of the ramps, the Belmont-Runyon School, and the accident site. Appendix 36 is an aerial photo of the construction site of the new school taken in August 2003.)

Because construction had not yet begun, the Traffic Engineer thought it possible to make small changes to the plans to help reduce the drug dealing in the problem sites, but this would have to be discussed with Urbitran Associates, the consulting engineers engaged by NJ DOT. Accordingly, a meeting was held with the Urbitran team on September 9, 2002 to gain a more detailed understanding of the changes to the ramps and the proposed construction timeline. It turned out that it would be more than one year before the construction would begin, and at least two years before its completion.

As this was too long to wait, the project staff began to consider an intervention plan to make drug purchases more difficult and risky and that could be implemented quickly. This plan would have to meet three important criteria: it must be inexpensive (requiring no major road works); it must complement the NJ DOT plans; and it must be acceptable to local residents and the city. It took a series of meetings between the project staff and City Traffic Engineers to develop the plan, the most important element of which consisted of changes to the direction of one-way

streets. The components of the plan are listed in Table 8, mapped in Appendix 35 and reported by the Newark *Star-Ledger* (Carter, 2003).

The plan was cleared with the local Councilman who pledged his support. An ordinance was drafted by the Traffic Engineers, approved by the City Engineer and eventually passed by the City Council on June 9, 2003. All elements of this plan had been implemented by November 1, 2003, at an estimated cost of \$40,000 including pavement markings, light stanchions, signage and salaries.⁴ (See Appendices 37 to 39 for photos of the enforcement zone sign, the cul-de-sac guardrail and one example of a notice of intention to introduce the traffic and parking changes).

THE POLICE INTERVENTION

To coincide with the introduction of the immediate traffic intervention detailed in Table 8, Captain Shane developed a police intervention plan. This plan was detailed in a 9-page “Director’s Memorandum” (see Appendix 40) issued by Robert Rankin, Police Director, on October 15, 2003. It came into effect on November 1, at the same time as the street changes laid out in Table 8 were to be completed. Its provisions can be summarized as follows:

1. *Working with Owners:* The NPD will invite owners to a meeting explaining the initiative and soliciting their participation and help. The personalized invitation letters will describe the nature of the problem at each owner’s building, provide calls-for-service information for the past year and outline code violations that the owner will need to address. At the meeting, owners will be told about the consequences for residents and the wider community

of failing to confront drug dealing on their premises. They will be advised about appropriate remedial actions and informed about the consequences of failing to comply with NPD recommendations. After the meeting, the owners will be given time to address the problems, and their progress will be monitored. Failure to take effective steps to reduce drug dealing will be followed by code enforcement by NPD.

2. *Enhanced Police Enforcement:* The enhanced enforcement has two objectives: to compel owners to reclaim their properties from the control of the dealers through code enforcement (see above), and to arrest dealers and disrupt the markets. Enforcement action directed against the dealers will include surveillance, buy-bust operations, vertical patrols, field interrogations, arrests, motor vehicle stops and asset forfeiture. The enhanced enforcement will require the contribution of nine different commands within the NPD, to be coordinated by Captain Shane as Commanding Officer of Policy and Planning Division. It requires detailed feedback to be provided to the Police Director through the Compstat process and through various written reports, including those on the results of two citizen satisfaction surveys to be mounted near the beginning and the end of the enhanced enforcement.
3. *Enlisting Media Support:* The media plan is designed to enlist media support and will also serve to warn potential drug buyers. The Newark newspaper, *The Star Ledger*, will be contacted about writing an article describing the project and the

problem of out-of-town drug buyers. The radio station, WBGO, will also be contacted about broadcasting public service announcements describing the project. Finally, the NPD will distribute leaflets explaining the project to households in the area.

Implementation

By January 14, 2004, the following elements of the plan had been implemented:

1. A meeting was held with the building owners at the four sites. They were told about the consequences for residents and the wider community of failing to confront drug dealing on their premises and were advised about appropriate remedial actions.
2. The first of a planned series of inspections by Police, Fire, Code and Health Departments was completed on December 30, 2003. Building owners were given 30 days to correct numerous code (plaster, paint and general repairs), health (mice, and rodent infestation) and fire (smoke detectors and exit signs) violations:
Site A. 35 code, 32 health and 10 fire violations
 - Site B. 30 code, 32 health and 18 fire violations
 - Site C. Building one: 40 code violations; 25 health violations; 12 fire violations (same as above); Building two: 30 code violations; 23 health violations; 12 fire violations (same as above); Building three: 45 code violations; 52 health violations; 13 fire violations (same as above)
 - At Site D, the property was under construction by new

owners, but the previous owners had many outstanding violations. The new owner was given an extension to correct the violations until the construction is complete.

3. On January 7, 2004 a follow up tour of the buildings revealed that most of the violations had been corrected. Vigorous monitoring is being conducted through Community Affairs and the South District Station's Community Service Officer.
4. As of January 14, 2004 the enhanced police enforcement had resulted in: 42 arrests; 38 summonses for moving violations; 10 vehicles impounded; and 13 field interrogation reports.
5. As part of the law enforcement effort, members of Community Affairs conducted a resident survey on December 22, 2003, designed to measure attitudes and perceptions about personal safety and drug dealing at the sites (excluding Site D). The results from a total of 167 residents are summarized in Table 9. In common with most other such surveys, there was a strong positive relationship found between residents' feelings of safety after dark, and their age with older people feeling more insecure. There was a negative relationship between age and victimization; the younger the resident, the more times they are likely to be victimized. These data supports the Police Department's effort to enforce curfew violations, and to direct intervention strategies at younger people.
6. *The Star Ledger* published an article describing the project and the problem of out-of-town drug buyers. The first article appeared on Sunday,

September 21, 2003 on page 25 of the County News section (Carter, 2003). A brief follow up article, written by the same reporter, was released on Friday, October 31, 2003, the day prior to implementation.

ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS

Methodology

The purpose of the assessment is to determine the effectiveness of the actions taken to reduce drug dealing at the apartment complexes in Loop 1. The methodological challenges of making this determination are listed below:

1. No direct measure exists of drug dealing at the apartment complexes. Police drug arrest data reflect police enforcement activity as much actual dealing. Drug calls for service data are strongly affected by public confidence in the police, which could increase or decrease in the course of the project.
2. Not only must the assessment cover the project team's intervention plan (the combined traffic management and enhanced police enforcement action), but it should also cover the NJ DOT's reconstruction of the I-78 exit ramps. While not directly intended to disrupt drug dealing in Loop 1, the reconstruction will make it much harder for out-of-town buyers to cruise the loop looking for drugs. This means that measurements should be taken in two "after" periods: when the project team's plan has been fully implemented and when reconstruction of the ramps is complete.
3. These interventions are not completely separate and overlap in

time. The reconstruction has already begun (the school near the ramps has been demolished and a new school is being built nearby to replace it) and will continue after the intervention designed by the project team is completed. Some of the traffic changes suggested by the project team have already been implemented, while others are yet to be made. This makes it difficult to define a period "before" the intervention during which data are gathered to serve as baseline for comparison with the two "after" intervention periods.

4. Drug dealing in Loop 1 could increase or decrease over time for reasons unconnected with either intervention.
5. If successful, the intervention in Loop 1 could displace drug dealing to nearby neighborhoods. Alternatively or in addition, the benefits of any decline in drug dealing in Loop 1 could diffuse to nearby neighborhoods resulting in reduced drug dealing there as well. Both of these outcomes complicate the choice of a "control" comparison area.

Limited resources and uncertainty about future funding made these challenges particularly problematic and the evaluation design leans more than usual towards practicality rather than rigor, as shown by the following provisions:

1. In the absence of existing data on dealing, NPD calls-for-service and arrest data relating to drugs, shooting and homicides will be used instead.
2. These data will be supplemented by small samples of observational data concerning drug deals at the apartment

- complexes. The purpose of the observations is to count the number of people stopping at the sites, and record whether they arrived by car or on foot, how long they stayed and whether they entered the building. An observation guide (Appendix 41) has been developed for the four project sites in Loop 1. There would be two observation periods, 7:00–9:00am and 3:00–5:00pm, for each weekday, for two weeks. This schedule would produce 40 hours of observations.⁵ These observations would be made for the “before” period and for both “after” periods.
3. The “before” data have not all been gathered at the same time. The police arrest and calls for service data are for 2001 (see Table 6). The traffic flow data are taken from the study conducted by Urbitran Associates when they were planning the interstate ramp improvement project in March 1988, and the observational data were collected in May 2003.
 4. Data on traffic flows cannot be collected in quite the same way for “before” and “after” periods. Traffic entering and leaving the I-78 ramp in Loop 1 can be counted in the same way, but the counts will not mean the same thing. In the “before” period, all the traffic counted had to traverse a portion of the loop. In the “after” periods, none of it *must* traverse the loop, but some of it might choose to if the driver is searching for drugs to buy. So a way must be found of counting I-78 traffic in the loop during the two “after” periods. To make the “before” data more comparable, ways will also be explored of estimating peak traffic flows for 2001 based on changes in the city’s day-time population between 1988 (when the traffic counts were made) and 2001.
 5. Detailed monitoring of Loop 1 to identify possible reasons for any decrease or increase in drug dealing unconnected with the interventions is beyond the resources of the project. For example, the demand for drugs might decline, which could result in fewer people seeking drugs to buy in the loop. However, the use of Loop 2 as an experimental control should reveal whether any such changes have affected an area beyond Loop 1. The difficulty of using Loop 2 as a control is that is near enough to be affected by both displacement and diffusion of benefits from Loop 1. For this reason, drug calls for service and drug arrests will also be compared, before and after, for Newark as a whole.

“Before” Data

Table 6 shows “before” data for drug calls for service and drug arrests for Loops 1 & 2 and for Newark as whole.

“Before” data on traffic flows collected by Urbitran for the period selected show that in the morning peak 1,990 vehicles entered the city from I-78, and 680 vehicles exited the area onto I-78. In the evening peak 1,585 vehicles used the ramps onto I-78 and 1,050 vehicles entered the city via the ramp.

Zanin and a Newark police officer in an unmarked car carried out the “before” observations of drug dealing at the

sites. The observations were made for two and a half days (April 23-25, 2003) when they were suspended as a result of threats from dealers at one location. During the 10 hours of observations, a total of 144 visitors were seen to arrive at the buildings (Site A, 24; Site B, 27; Site C, 54; Site D, 39). Seventy-three were on foot (some of whom might have parked their cars out of sight of the observers), 68 were in vehicles and 2 were on bicycles. Seventy-two (50%) stayed for less than two minutes.

LESSONS TO DATE

The interventions planned for Loop 1 have not yet been fully implemented and it will be several years before their effectiveness can be assessed. However, some valuable information has already been gathered in the course of the project concerning:

1. the process of implementing a problem-oriented policing project in a large, crime-ridden northeastern city,
2. drug markets in privately-rented apartment complexes and the contributory role of nearby highways
3. the utility of the COPS Problem-Oriented Guide for Police on *Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes*.

Implementing Problem-Oriented Policing

Judging by the annual submissions for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-oriented Policing, the strongholds of this approach are in the south and west of the country, with a particular concentration in California (Scott and Clarke, 2000). This is usually explained by a combination of favorable policing conditions in these regions – better educated officers and more open routes to promotion, a higher proportion of well resourced and funded departments, less hide-bound union

and management practices, and a greater willingness to experiment and to use up-to-date technology, including computerized mapping and crime analysis.

Few of these conditions pertain in the NPD, which has never embraced problem-oriented policing as a routine way of conducting business. Fortunately, senior officers were open to the concept and it did not really have to be “sold” to the department. Even so, many bureaucratic hurdles were experienced in dealing with some police department units and with other departments in the city. In most cases, these were the result of staff’s unwillingness to release information or make resources available without a direct order from their superiors. In other cases, internal priorities or what appeared to be inefficiency led to considerable delays for the project.

The following special circumstances allowed the project to get as far as it did:

1. Dr George Kelling, Director of the Rutgers Police Institute, had developed a close working relationship with the NPD, particularly with the Police Director, Joseph Santiago. Without this relationship, the project might not have got off the ground and, as it progressed, the necessary help from district commanders and other senior officers might not have been forthcoming.
2. The project was assigned an unusually efficient and well-informed captain (the commanding officer of the Policy and Planning Division), who championed the project effectively within the Department. With the exception of a temporary reassignment in the middle of the project, he remained with the project during various changes of Police Director and Police Chief. This continuity was both fortuitous and unusual, but it was extremely important for the project.

3. The COPS grant not only supported the work of the consultant but also allowed the part-time employment of a graduate student from the Rutgers School of Criminal Justice who was able to undertake the routine data collection and analysis required for any large problem-oriented policing project. This support was made available by adjusting the original budget when it became clear the NPD's limited analytic capacity was already fully stretched and could not be of much help to the project. Unfortunately, the funds were only sufficient for paying an hourly rate to a full-time graduate student, who worked on the project whenever his schedule allowed. This precluded timely, in depth analysis, and at several points, corners were cut in the interests of maintaining the projects' momentum. The relatively short time-scale of the COPS grant also meant that firm plans for the assessment stage could not be made.
4. The city's Traffic Engineer and his department were open and progressive, which permitted the development of the traffic plan to inhibit drug dealing in the Loop 1. The NJDOT plans to change the ramps from the I-78 dovetailed neatly with the project and serendipitously helped it.
5. Local communities typically resist changes in traffic patterns, even those designed to reduce crime, but no opposition to the traffic plan was encountered from residents in Loop 1. This may have been because the neighborhood is too poor and fragmented to have a residents' association. However, the local Councilman provided crucial support for the changes.
6. The budget for the Field Applications project permitted a meeting to be held of all the consultants and police involved in the various cities. This meeting was important in sharing experiences, in

maintaining morale and in meeting project deadlines – none of the teams wanted to be embarrassed. COPS made it possible for the project team to make two further presentations of the work in Newark to professional audiences.

What if anything can be learned from this list about introducing problem-oriented policing in a department like Newark where it has not been implemented before? Some of the conditions listed above are so serendipitous or unique that they could not be replicated, but there are three that should be required for any future projects of this type:

1. money to pay for on-site, day-to-day analytic support
2. an undertaking from the partnering police department to maintain continuity in project personnel
3. regularly scheduled off-site meetings of the project team with the funding agency to present progress reports.

Meeting these conditions could be more important than the usual "sweeteners" such as overtime or other money for the department that federal agencies provide to police departments participating in research or development projects. No such funds were made available to the NPD and it is doubtful that they would have made any difference to the progress of the project, which had a momentum of its own.

Drug Markets, Private Apartment Complexes and Nearby Highways

Drug markets are commonly located in low-cost, privately rented apartment buildings in the poorer parts of cities. Drug dealing and economic deprivation are of course strongly associated and it is not surprising that privately rented apartment buildings may be particularly at risk. First, apartment buildings generally, whether public or

private, offer a safe haven to dealers when pursued by police. Once they get into the building, they can dispose of the drugs in their possession before the police can find them. Second, many private apartment buildings in poor neighborhoods are very badly run and managed. The slumlords owning them try to make as much money as they can by investing as little as possible. Consequently, security measures, background checks and proper management procedures are all given short shrift (Clarke and Bichler-Robertson 1998). Third, some of the tenants might already have been excluded from public housing for drug and other violations, while others might have sought out the apartments precisely because poor security and absent management would assist drug dealing.

By counting and mapping private apartment complexes in the city, the present project has provided some new information about the association between these complexes and drug markets. First, only a small minority, perhaps less than 5%, of the complexes in the city have well-established, troublesome drug markets. Second, these troublesome complexes are highly concentrated in the poorest, most blighted parts of the city and, third, they are particularly concentrated close to access points to a major highway running past the city. Prior research has found that drug markets in poor neighborhoods are frequently located near to major arterial roads (Eck 1994; Rengert 2000; Reuter 1985)

It is dangerous to make generalizations from a single case, but these observations suggest the following model of the association between drug markets and privately rented apartment buildings:

1. Lack of educational skills and employment opportunities supply the economic motive for many young

- men in poor cities to engage in drug dealing and drug use.
2. The particular difficulty of policing drug dealing in apartments, especially in poorly managed and poorly secured ones, helps explain the emergence of drug markets in these buildings. Indeed, rational offenders might deliberately seek access to these buildings, either by renting apartments themselves, or as the police believe, by developing relationships with single mothers already resident.
3. Buildings with ready access to a major highway are particularly likely to develop active drug markets because they attract an out-of-town, affluent clientele. These buyers do not wish to stray too far into the city, or buy drugs on their way to and from work in the city. The buildings are easily recognized and found.
4. Drug transactions are facilitated when buyers do not have to leave their cars and can easily double-park or park by the sidewalk (which was the case for several of the Loop 1 buildings).

This model, which encompasses a range of social, economic, geographic, situational and policing variables, needs to be tested in empirical research involving a number of different cities.

Utility of the POP Guide

Copies of *Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes* were given to anyone whose help was sought in the project. It greatly helped in explaining the project's goals, though many of those consulted thought that a more useful focus for Newark would have been drug markets in public housing. Rather little feedback was received on the guide, but those who commented

were positive both about its presentation and content.

Undoubtedly, the guide would have been of more use had the project persisted with its original aim of modifying the environment and management practices in two or three carefully selected apartment complexes. As explained, the project metamorphosed into an attempt to increase the difficulty and risks for out-of-towners seeking to purchase drugs in the city, especially at some private apartment complexes in a loop off the Interstate running by the city. This was a narrower and somewhat different problem from that covered by the guide. The guide did include changing traffic patterns as one option for reducing drug dealing at private apartment complexes, but naturally enough, it contained only limited information about how to do this.

The greatest use made of the guide was in formulating the police intervention to accompany the traffic changes. Here it was useful in two ways – it provided a list of different policing strategies that were systematically considered in formulating the plan adopted; and it provided useful commentary on police experience of using these tactics, which assisted with the final selection.

The project team remained highly enthusiastic about the guide even though limited use was made of it. The project's findings about the extent of drug markets in privately rented apartment complexes clearly support the need for such a guide. The project also whetted the appetite for another guide that would be more directly focused on the problem eventually

addressed. It is unclear whether this will be a common result of attempting to apply a guide in the field, but as more guides are made available it will presumably become less common.

CONCLUSIONS

Due to a combination of fortunate circumstances this project was more successful than might have been expected given the limited funding and the somewhat inhospitable environment for the following reasons:

1. Because street closures have been used successfully in poor neighborhoods to reduce many crime problems, including drug dealing and associated violence (Clarke In Press), there is a real chance that it might lead to the reduction of drug dealing in a troubled part of Newark.
2. The project has given a wide range of NPD officers some direct exposure to problem-oriented policing.
3. It makes a contribution to the small literature on research collaboration between police and universities.
4. It provides more evidence that privately owned apartment complexes in poor cities can provide fertile ground for drug markets, especially when these are located near to major highways.
5. As intended, it provides a test of the utility of the new series of problem-oriented guides produced by COPS. While the guide was not used as expected, the project strongly endorsed the concept underlying the production of the guides, i.e. policing is greatly assisted by research findings when these are presented in an easily used format.

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Tables

Table 1: Information Gathered from Ride-alongs with SCTF and SIU

1. Newark has many drug markets, scattered throughout the city. They can be found at a variety of different locations – street corners, near (or in) fast food restaurants and convenience stores, in private residences, and in privately rented and public housing complexes.
2. Time of day plays an important role in Newark drug markets. The highest traffic times at some markets are in the morning and afternoon, while others are busiest at night
3. Functional drug users purchase on their way to and from work. Drug markets near highways facilitate easy access and fast transactions for commuters.
4. Many buyers are out-of-towners, who come from nearby suburbs to Newark specifically to buy drugs. In some cases, buyers come from much further away facilitated by the city's excellent access to highways.
5. Heroin and cocaine are the main substances traded, but there are also sizable markets in marijuana and crack. Many markets dealt in all these substances.
6. Numerous apartment complexes with active drug markets were identified, but officers were often unsure whether these were privately owned or public housing.
7. Buyers approach these markets by vehicle or on foot. The ability to make purchases without leaving the car facilitates transactions and sometimes the dealer may get into the buyer's car. Transactions also take place in front of, or inside the apartment buildings.
8. Drugs may be stashed inside the building, in parked cars or on vacant land by the buildings.
9. As soon as they see police, dealers retreat into the apartment complex buildings. They could enter any of the apartments in the building and are impossible to find in time with the drugs still in their possession.

Table 2: Frequencies of Arrest Data for 2001 (N=9978)

Variable		Frequency	%
Sex (n=9592)	Male	8158	85.1
	Female	1434	14.9
Race (n=9566)	Black	7005	73.2
	White	1330	13.9
	Hispanic	1231	12.9
Newark Resident (n=9978)	Yes	7120	71.4
	No	2858	28.6
Heroin (n=9978)	Yes	3172	31.8
	No	6806	68.2
Cocaine (n=9978)	Yes	2989	30.0
	No	6989	70.0
Marijuana (n=9978)	Yes	1544	15.5
	No	8434	84.5
Crack (n=9978)	Yes	965	9.7
	No	9013	90.3
Hashish (n=9978)	Yes	2	0.0
Hallucinogens (n=9978)	Yes	0	0.0

District	Total Calls		Drug Calls	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
North	105,601	26.0	6778	32.1
East	105,804	26.1	1426	6.7
South	94,214	23.2	6033	28.5
West	100,325	24.7	6912	32.7
Total	405,995	100	21149	100

Site	Identified	Excluded	Why excluded
Site 1	Ride Along	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 2	Ride Along	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 3	Ride Along	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 4	Ride Along	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 5	Ride Along		
Site 6	Ride Along	Yes	Not in drug hot spot
Site 7	Ride Along		
Site 8	Ride Along		
Site 9	Ride Along	Yes	Not in drug hot spot
Site 10	Ride Along	Yes	Not in drug hot spot
Site 11	Ride Along	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 12	Ride Along	Yes	No longer a problem
Site 13	Ride along		
Site 14	Ride Along		
Site 15	Ride Along		
Site 16	Ride Along	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 17	Analysis	Yes	< 15 arrests
Site 18	Analysis		
Site 19	Analysis		
Site 20	Analysis		
Site 21	Analysis		
Site 22	Analysis		

Table 5: Arrest Data for 22 Sites, 2001

	No. Arrests	Newark Resident %	Male %	Heroin %	Cocaine %	Crack %	Marij. %	Mean Age
Site 1	9	89	100	0	89	0	11	22
Site 2	6	67	85	0	33	0	17	21
Site 3	4	100	100	50	0	25	0	24
Site 4	85	82	81	25	65	5	4	24
Site 5	9	34	100	33	22	11	0	28
Site 6	120	22	78	20	4	1	2	28
Site 7	61	49	79	41	59	0	2	26
Site 8	27	82	100	7	0	0	67	25
Site 9	22	86	86	9	68	0	18	24
Site 10	36	69	83	83	8	0	3	28
Site 11	9	67	67	33	56	0	0	24
Site 12	69	55	77	29	19	7	6	28
Site 13	21	81	95	5	14	57	0	29
Site 14	3	100	100	0	67	0	0	26
Site 15	14	71	86	0	0	57	7	31
Site 16	10	70	70	0	80	0	0	20
Site 17	50	78	80	52	46	0	2	27
Site 18	52	71	86	6	6	40	4	26
Site 19	100	48	70	51	5	1	0	35
Site 20	58	70	69	2	21	57	3	19
Site 21	67	69	92	48	49	0	3	26
Site 22	55	49	73	5	7	0	0	32

Table 6: Private Apartment Complexes and Problem Complexes by Police District

District	No. Complexes	No. Problem Complexes	% Problem Complexes
North	142	3	2%
East	307	0	0%
West	43	2	5%
South	14	4	29%
All	506	9	2%

Table 7: Comparison of Loops with Newark as a Whole

	City of Newark	Loop 1 as % of City	Loop 2 as % of City
Land Area	24.45 sq mi	1.1%	1.9%
Population	263,087	3.0%	3.7%
Drug Calls for Service	15,729	5.9%	5.7%
Drug Arrests	1984	4.8%	5.8%
Total Homicides	28	14.3%	7.1%
Gun Homicides	21	14.3%	4.8%
Shooting Calls for Service	182	7.1%	4.4%
Shots fired Calls for Service	882	4.9%	5.3%

Table 8: NJ DOT Traffic Plan

1. All incoming traffic will be rerouted to Elizabeth Ave, a non-residential arterial street. Incoming traffic will be unable to access local residential streets directly.
2. Outbound traffic will also access the ramps via Elizabeth Ave.
3. A “horseshoe” will connect Hillside Ave and Johnson Ave, eliminating access to the ramps from these streets.
4. Milford Ave will be made into a cul-de-sac, eliminating access to the ramps
5. Irvine Turner Blvd becomes two-way with no access.


Table 9: Immediate Traffic Plan

1. Bring forward NJ DOT plans to make Irvine Turner Blvd two-way (formerly one way towards the I-78). This will reduce the ability of buyers to double-park in front of the problem building.
2. At the same time, restrict parking on Irvine Turner Blvd.
3. Switch direction of traffic on W. Alpine (a one-way street), to eliminate quick access to problem buildings and to push traffic further into city.
4. Switch direction of traffic on Milford Ave, to reduce access to problem building
5. Install a “High Priority Enforcement Zone” sign on Hillside Avenue at the ramp off the I-78 to warn potential buyers entering the city.
6. Install guardrail at Johnson Ave cul-de-sac, to block illegal through-traffic and escape route.


Table 10: Summary of Police Resident Survey Results, Sites A-C, December 22, 2003

1. Has it been safe to walk inside or around your building after dark? (65.9% felt unsafe or very unsafe.)
2. Have you heard gunshots inside or around your building? (69.5% replied yes, always or sometimes)
3. Have you been the victim of a crime inside or around your building? (25% between 1 and 3 times)
4. Have you seen drug dealers inside or around your building? (83.2% replied yes, always or sometimes)
5. Have you seen open drug sales inside or around your building? (82.5% replied yes, always or sometimes)
6. If you have seen drug dealing, when does most of the activity take place? (87.3% replied night and day)

Appendix 1 Density Map of 2001 Drug Arrests in Newark Including District Boundaries




Appendix 2 Map of 2001 Drug Arrests in Newark, Density Map and Pinmap



Appendix 3 Twenty-Two Problem Sites with District Boundaries



Appendix 4 Six Remaining Sites Presented to District Commanders and District Boundaries




Appendix 5 The Methodology for Counting Apartment Complexes in Newark

The Tax Assessors office was contacted to obtain a list of apartment buildings in the city and, after some negotiations, two datasets were provided – the tax assessors dataset and a list of addresses from the post office. The datasets were current as of March 2002.


The tax assessor's database contained 45,272 entries. Each entry was classified as residential (single family home), commercial, apartment, tax-exempt, etc. The database also included information about assessed value and owner information, but had limited information about property size. 1,049 entries were classified as 4C, the code for apartment buildings. Inspection of the 4C entries revealed that some apartment buildings in our sample of "problem apartment complexes" were not included in this category, but were classified as 15F, or "other exempt". Further inquiries revealed that 15F properties were tax exempt because they were subsidized housing. Altogether, there were 2,076 entries classified as 15F and when these were combined with 4C properties yielded a total of 3,125 entries.

To determine how many of the properties listed under the 15F category were not apartments, the post office database of 28,625 entries was examined. The tax assessor's office created a separate database of 12,203 entries labeled as apartments. These entries were not always for a single address; some entries covered numerous apartment numbers, and some addresses had numerous entries. The GIS analyst from the MIS Division of the Newark PD condensed this database, selecting out each unique address. The resulting database, "apcount", had 3,762 unique addresses. The next step was to reconcile apcount with the tax assessor's 3,125 entries under the 4C and 15F categories. This exercise allowed individual apartment addresses to be matched in the two databases and also allowed them to be assigned to particular buildings. This yielded a count of 506 privately owned apartment complexes.

Appendix 6 Private Apartment Complex Density Map




Appendix 7 Loops 1 and 2 in Relation to Interstate 78



Appendix 8 Loop 1



Appendix 9 Loop 2



Appendix 10 Interstate 78 Ramps, Belmont Runyon School, Site of Accident



Appendix 11 Aerial Photo of Loop 1 with Driving Patterns



Appendix 12 Map of Loop 1 with Driving Patterns and Project Sites



Appendix 13 Identification of Project Sites

Naming Project Sites	
Original Name from list of 22	New Project Site Name
Site 6	Site A
Site 7	Site B
Site 5	Site C
Identified at Commander Meeting	Site D

Appendix 14 Aerial Photo of Site A



Appendix 15 Front of Site A



Appendix 16 View In Front of Site A



Appendix 17 View to Left of Site A



Appendix 18 View to Right of Site A



Appendix 19 Aerial Photo of Site B



Appendix 20 Front of Site B



Appendix 21 View From Site B



Appendix 22 View to Left of Site B



Appendix 23 View to Right of Site B



Appendix 24 Aerial Photo of Site C



Appendix 25 Front of Site C



Appendix 26 Front of Site C



Appendix 27 Side of Site C



Appendix 28 Front of Site C



Appendix 29 Front of Site C



Appendix 30 Front of Site D



Appendix 31 Left of Site D



Appendix 32 Right of Site D



Appendix 33 View From Site D



Appendix 36: Construction of New School



Appendix 37: Enforcement Zone Sign



Appendix 38: Cul-de-sac Guardrail



Appendix 39: Advance Notice of Traffic Changes



Appendix 41 Observation Guide

An observation guide was completed every time a visitor stopped at the site. The weather conditions were obtained from weather.com prior to beginning the observation period.

Site Conditions

1. Site ID
2. Date
3. Time
 - a. Arrive
 - b. Depart
4. Weather
 - a. Temp
 - b. Rain
5. Presence of potential dealers
 - a. Dealer Actions
 - i. Loitering
 - ii. Wave down buyer
 - iii. Approach cars
 - iv. Stand in roadway
 - b. Use of Lookouts
 - i. Foot
 - ii. Bicycle
 - iii. Window
 - iv. Rooftop
 - c. Communications
 - i. Cell phone
 - ii. 2-way radio
6. Number of people at site
 - a. At arrival
 - b. At departure
7. Guardians Present
 - a. Police
 - b. Residents
 - c. Apartment Management
 - d. City Agencies
 - e. Utility Employees

Transaction Variables

1. Visitor Actions
 - a. Drive up
 - i. Stay in car
 - ii. Get out of car
 1. On View
 2. Out of View
 - a. Leave Site
 - b. Enter Building

- b. Walk up
 - i. On View
 - ii. Out of View
 - 1. Leave Site
 - 2. Enter Building

- c. Bicycle
 - i. Stay with bicycle
 - ii. Leave bicycle
 - 1. On View
 - 2. Out of View
 - a. Leave Site
 - b. Enter Building

¹ The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police summarize knowledge about how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention and to improving the overall response to incidents, not to investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. They are written for police of whatever rank or assignment who must address the specific problem the guides cover. The guides are produced by the COPS Office; other guides in the series include: Street Prostitution, Speeding in Residential Areas, Burglary of Single Family Homes, Theft of and from Cars in Parking Facilities. Additional information about the guides and the COPS Office can be found at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov> and <http://www.popcenter.org>

² Rutgers faculty, particularly Dr. George Kelling, Director of the university's Police Institute, have an ongoing relationship with the Newark Police Department. The Police Institute has played an important part in developing the Greater Newark Safer Cities Initiative (GNSCI).

³ The cell size was 20 feet, and the search radius was 500 feet, and kernel smoothing was used when creating the map.

⁴ An additional "High Priority Enforcement Zone" sign was also erected along a major thoroughfare feeding the loop from the city.

⁵ Each of the four sites would be visited during each period and each site would be observed for half an hour, from the same observation point. The starting point of observations would be rotated among the four sites.